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Abstract In this overview of governance mechanisms developed within open
source software (OSS) circles, three types of governance are studied: ‘spontaneous’
governance, internal governance, and governance towards outside parties. More-
over, two main ways in which lessons from OSS can be applied elsewhere are
explored: peer production of products other than software, and embedding ‘peer-
produced’ products and peer processes into existing institutions (‘coupling’).
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1 Introduction
The preceding contributions by Jørgensen, Hertel, O’Mahony, and Markus about
governance of open source software (OSS) reveal an amazing repertoire of
governance mechanisms. In this final overview I will weave several strands in their
arguments together by distinguishing three types of OSS governance (‘spontaneous’
governance, internal governance, and governance towards outside parties). These
roughly correspond to historical phases of both OSS development itself and studies
about OSS. At the end, I venture some remarks about the ‘lessons’ of OSS
governance to be applied elsewhere: peer production may apply to other kinds of
products, and become embedded within existing institutions (‘coupling’).
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2 Point of departure: governance of the source code commons
OSS ‘hackers’ conceive of themselves as a movement to correct the failure of
existing institutions (both industry and academia) to produce software adequately.
By putting the source code of their programs on websites and constantly exchanging
comments, patches, and new features, these hackers created a new institutional
mode: peer production of software. As such, they exemplify a true ‘community of
practice’, a globally distributed and virtual one at that.
As for the movement’s ideology, two main currents can be distinguished. The
more radical camp considers closed code software production as harmful, and
espouses the view that software should be a public good, both publicly available and
modifiable. To that end, they created a new regulatory framework, close to the
public domain: the GPL that allows free use, modification, and (re)distribution of
source code. However, one strict rule applies: any (re)distribution should carry the
same license terms. Consequently, GPL-ed code will remain in the source code
commons, in all its modifications and recombinations. These self-perpetuating
regulations (sometimes referred to as ‘viral’) serve to protect the commons from
private appropriation. To a large extent, the temptation to ‘defect’ is eliminated. As
a corollary, the commons’ resources remain up-to-date (thereby preventing the
potential ‘tragedy’ of non-maintenance of the commons).
From the beginning of the movement a more moderate camp has also been in
existence. To those hackers the main defect of industrial software production is its
closed character, barring public inspection of the code. As a result, those programs
are often inferior. OSS is considered the remedy to optimize software quality. To
that end, a more relaxed kind of source code commons suffices, regulated by the
BSD (and BSD-like) licenses. These allow almost anything to be done with the
source code, apart from proper authorship notification. Their commons is (almost)
unregulated and (almost) identical to the public domain. To them, protection from
private appropriation is unnecessary.
These regulated commons are the point of departure for the whole OSS
movement. The formal terms of open source licenses set the stage for a new
institutional framework. It is important to stress this at the outset. As we shall see
below, around the year 2000, hackers in larger projects renewed their attention to
this defining framework, and decided to strengthen it by establishing non-profit
foundational structures.
3 Phase one: ‘spontaneous’ governance
The first wave of OSS studies focused on the backgrounds and motivations of the
volunteers involved. It soon turned out that the prevailing image of high school
nerds fond of hacking had to be corrected. Although they are about 100% male
indeed—as the stereotype would have it—, about half of them are in their thirties or
forties, obtained academic ICT qualifications, have paid jobs, and are allowed to
perform OSS work during work hours. As for the motivations involved (cf. Hertel,
this issue), a mix of both internal and external motivation was found to be present.
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Roughly in order of importance, volunteers enjoy the intellectual stimulus, want to
learn and improve their skills, need the program involved for their work or their
personal use, like to obtain recognition, or believe that source code should be open.
A typical cluster analysis yielded four main types of motivation: intellectual
stimulation and improvement of skills; a sense of obligation to the open source
community; a need for the program for private uses; a need for the program for
work (Lakhani and Wolf 2005).
Remarkably, these outcomes show that the movement is able to attract volunteers
with a variety of motivations. In particular, both egoistic motivations (‘rent-
seekers’) and altruistic motivations (‘donators’) are found to be present. This
remarkable feat has been attributed to the GPL framework that governs most of the
source code commons. It generates incentives for participation by both rentseekers
and donors (Franck and Jungwirth 2003). Rent-seeking does not crowd out
donations. As such, the framework may be considered one of the main conditions
for the success of this social movement. Notice though that only a minority of
hackers are staunch supporters of the cause of free software as a public good. But on
the other hand, the large majority of OSS projects chooses to operate under GPL-
conditions. This apparent paradox has as yet not been satisfactorily resolved.
The tacit assumption underlying these studies is that these communities of
practice, crossing all institutional boundaries, are self-directing without any kind of
explicit and formal coordination or control. Apart from the licensing framework,
these communities are supposed to spontaneously create a stream of innovations.
Any coordination and control that emerges, is the natural outcome of the differential
number of contributions per person. Studies persistently show that a minority (about
20%) actually produces most of the code contributions (about 80%). This enables
the high-performers to constitute themselves as informal leaders of the pack (cf.
Muller 2006).
4 Phase two: internal governance
In the next wave of studies about OSS, this assumption was questioned.
Spontaneous informal coordination turned out to be a relict from the past, at least
for larger projects that had been in existence for a longer time. These projects
employ a whole collection of explicit and formal tools for internal governance (i.e.,
coordination and control of OSS project work to achieve optimal outcomes; cf.
Markus, this issue). The main tools can be usefully grouped into six categories:
modularization, division of roles, delegation of decision-making, training and
indoctrination, formalization, and autocracy/democracy.
(1) Modularization. In most projects, as the number of participants grew, the
program was split in several modules. Literally dozens of modules may coexist
together. This basic mechanism is almost universally employed across larger
OSS projects. Similarly, the distinction between a stable and an experimental
version is regularly employed in order to give both innovation and
maintenance their own niches.
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(2) Division of roles. Bundles of tasks are distinguished, and associated with
differentiated access to project files. Several role divisions are in use,
distinguishing from three up to eight roles. The common model as used on the
Tigris platform, for example, reads as follows (cf. www.tigris.org, accessed
February 2007). An observer is expected to participate in ongoing discussions
on mailing lists; accordingly, (s)he has access to project documentation and
files. A developer is expected to do likewise, but in addition to develop source
code for patches and new features. For the purpose, (s)he can access the source
code tree (but not officially change it). On top is the project owner who
manages the whole project, both internally and towards the outside world.
Elsewhere, other role divisions can be found. The observer may be split into
the ‘user’ (who only uses the software) and the ‘contributor’ (who also takes
part in discussions). The developer may be split into the ‘developer’ proper
(who may write code but not commit it to the official tree) and the ‘committer’
(who may). For large projects the project owner is usually seconded by several
‘maintainers’ (also known as ‘module owners’). In due time, ‘directors’ may
be appointed on top. A ‘translator’, a ‘porter’, a ‘web designer’, a ‘technical
writer’, an ‘international liaison’, a ‘super reviewer’, a ‘release manager’ or
‘driver’—the list of invented roles is endless. What matters here is, that role
divisions may vary, from a small number of roles (mostly three) up to a much
larger number.
(3) Delegation of decision-making. In OSS projects, decisions have to be made
about the start of new activities, the methods to be used, the integration of
modules into new releases, up to community-wide issues. One of the most
important kind of decisions, however, has to do with code acceptance: which
source code is accepted for incorporation into the experimental version, and—
if it exists—ultimately into the stable product version? It is, of course, up to all
participants (observers excepted) to actually create, test, and submit new
source code. However, what level is entitled to make the decision about the
subsequent actual inclusion of submitted code? The arrangements vary from
centralized to decentralized designs.
In a centralized design, it is only the project leader (plus possibly some
assistants) who is charged with such decisions; the classic example is the
Linux kernel project with Linus Torvalds personally deciding upon all code
changes to the experimental version. In a decentralized design, it is up to
committers (or developers) in a given module to take these decisions. This can
be found in projects such as Apache, Debian, Gnome, Mozilla, and Netbeans.
After developers have tried and tested new code in their own personal copy of
the source code tree, sometimes changes have to be reviewed first by fellow
developers (once or even several times), before inclusion in the main tree. This
might include taking a vote. In other projects and/or circumstances,
committers may go ahead and import their changes in the official tree;
reviewing via discussion boards (and/or voting) happens after code inclusion.
The latter variety obviously speeds up the software development process
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considerably (but at a risk). So in all, a wide range of designs exists, from
centralized to decentralized designs.
(4) Training and indoctrination. In earlier times, conditions for entry were none.
However, while projects grew larger and a division of roles imposed itself,
entry requirements came to be formulated. At Debian, e.g., contributors who
desire to become developers (with commit privileges) have to succeed a three-
step application process with a Debian developer (‘sponsor’) (cf. Coleman and
Hill 2005). They have to prove their identity (by having their cryptographic
key signed face-to-face), prove their knowledge of and allegiance to OSS
philosophy, and demonstrate their technical competences. Similar ‘examina-
tions’ exist inside freeBSD and Mozilla, focusing upon technical competences
only (Holck and Jørgensen 2003/4).
(5) Formalization. Several formal tools and procedures have been invented in the
OSS arena in order to knit globally distributed virtual contributors together.
Mailing lists and newsgroup archives enable discussion to take place. Tools
like Bugzilla standardize bug reporting and the raising of issues for discussion.
Versioning systems (from CVS and Subversion up to GIT) let distributed
authors work together simultaneously on the code tree and keep track of all
changes. For testing purposes tools such as tinderboxes and ‘verification
machines’ compile source code on a regular basis (cf. Jørgensen, this issue).
Elaborate procedures have also been developed, in particular for testing,
reporting bugs, and sending in new code. As regards all these tools and
procedures, I am not aware of any serious objections raised against them.
Moreover, the whole OSS community seems to have effectively standardized
on the use of them, a remarkable achievement (Robbins 2005). Therefore,
taking up a distinction coined by Adler and Borys a decade ago (1996), I
interpret this formalization as ‘enabling’ (allowing hackers to better perform
their tasks), not as ‘coercive’ (an attempt to force compliance).
(6) Autocracy/democracy. Is leadership self-appointed and imposed from above
(autocracy), or are community members empowered to choose their leaders in
some kind of electoral process (representative democracy)? Autocracy is
evident in Linux; Linus Torvalds initiated the project and has remained the
leader ever since (at least for the kernel). In many smaller OSS projects their
founders also stay on as autocratic leaders. In a similar vein, self-electing
committees at the top may hold power (like in Perl and Mozilla). On the other
hand, democratic processes for electing leadership may be instituted.
Examples involve Debian, where the Project Leader is elected annually by
developers; freeBSD, where committers choose the ‘core team’; and Netbeans,
in which developers choose the governing board. Project leaders function as
primi inter pares.
On the basis of this array of governance tools, OSS communities assume some
overall design. Within the multitude of possible OSS designs, I will now venture to
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identify typical OSS configurations, i.e., combinations of internally consistent
scores on OSS governance dimensions. As Markus (this issue) forcefully argues, the
search for configurations is to be considered the way forward for OSS analysis. Just
as Henry Mintzberg distinguished essential configurations for hierarchical firms in
1979 (Mintzberg 1979), this needs to be done for volunteer OSS communities now.
Notice that for all OSS designs, some kind of hierarchy is in evidence. While
tasks may be chosen voluntarily, access to files has to be granted, new code for
inclusion be approved of, code freezes be respected, tools and procedures be
accepted. This is, however, not the usual hierarchy, but one of esteem. If volunteers
want to obtain esteem from the project leader(s) of a particular project, they have no
choice but to play by their rules, or leave. In view of this hierarchy nexus, there is a
close analogy with the usual non-volunteer organizations. To put this correspon-
dence into relief in my configurational analysis, each of the OSS governance
dimensions as distinguished above will be ‘paired’ with its more usual organiza-
tional analogue: (1) ‘modularization’ corresponds to ‘horizontal differentiation’, (2)
‘division of roles’ to ‘vertical differentiation’, (3) ‘delegation of decision-making’
to ‘vertical decentralization’, while the three remaining OSS dimensions have the
same denominations in organizational analysis. This correspondence will allow
comparisons of OSS configurations with the usual hierarchical configurations (of
which Mintzberg’s Pentagon is a prime example). For ease of exposition, I will
henceforth mainly use the ‘usual’ organizational dimensions—but it has to be borne
in mind that they may have a specific, slightly different meaning in the context of
OSS.
With this analogy in mind, my conjecture about OSS configurations is, that these
tend towards—at least—two ‘natural’ configurations. On the one hand, communities
may originate as autocratic ventures. Being small, one leader provides enough
structure. When they grow larger, coordination and control of modules (horizontal
differentiation) require ever more attention. Given autocratic control, it is most
consistent for leaders to move towards a high degree of vertical differentiation,
vertical centralization, and formalization. Employing the distinction between
‘mechanistic’ and ‘organic’ systems of management as coined by Burns and
Stalker decades ago (1961), I refer to this configuration as an ‘autocratic-
mechanistic’ structure (Table 1). On the other hand, from the outset communities
may be run as a cooperative with collegial control (direct democracy). Upon
expansion and differentiation into several modules, these communities, in keeping
with their egalitarian ethos, will gravitate towards representative democratic
procedure, as well as keeping the amount of vertical differentiation and vertical
centralization as low as possible. Formalization, as the means par excellence to
connect virtual members together, remains indispensable. At the same time, training
and indoctrination assume paramount importance. A ‘democratic-organic’ structure
ensues (Table 1).
Due to the correspondences established above, a comparison with Mintberg’s
configurations can easily be made. The ‘mechanistic’ part of the first configuration
is close to Mintzberg’s ‘machine bureaucracy’, though in keeping with the network
character of OSS projects the bureaucracy involved is more properly interpreted as
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an ‘enabling bureaucracy’ a` la Adler and Borys (1996). The ‘organic’ part of the
second configuration is close to Mintzberg’s ‘professional bureaucracy’, though
remarkably enough with a high degree of formalization (while ‘enabling’). So
contrary to the usual typifications, a high degree of horizontal differentiation (in
modules) and formalization (in the ‘enabling’ sense) are a hallmark of both OSS
configurations (cf. bold type in Table 1). In order to attract and retain virtual
volunteers in great numbers from all over the globe, these features are (to be)
retained at all times.
Of course this is just an idealtypische kind of exercise; actual configurations of
OSS communities will show a lot more variation. Moreover, the exercise refers to
larger communities only, with several hundreds of members. As long as projects
remain confined to some dozens of people—which applies to the majority of
projects on open source platforms—, a ‘simple structure’ suffices (a strong project
leader that personally coordinates developers and observers). Future research will
have to connect these two ideal type configurations to relevant contingencies, such
as the age of the project, the size of the community, and the type of software
involved (see Ye et al. 2005, for one of the first exercises of the kind).
This distinction between two configurations also enables some answers to the
question posed in the call for papers that started the JMG roundtable about OSS
governance (cf. de Laat, Introduction (...), this issue): does governance rely on
control, trust, or both? It would seem that whenever projects gravitate towards a
democratic-organic regime, trust is the main mechanism, trust in the double sense of
trusting project members to work loyally towards the project’s goals and trusting
them to sensibly choose its leadership. An autocratic-mechanistic regime expresses
quite the opposite: participants as both workers and voters are highly distrusted,
control (in the coercive sense) of their behaviour on both counts is mainly relied
upon. High formalization figures in both regimes, while this is a control that is
enabling, not coercive out of distrust.
At the present day, worries are mounting about hackers’ contributions of source
code. Code may be sloppy, have bugs, contain Trojan horses (viruses), carry a non-
compatible license, or introduce patented matter. Reverting such changes from the
main tree of source code is a nuisance. Organic arrangements are especially
sensitive to these dangers. How are such projects likely to react? As a first measure






Horizontal differentiation (modularization) High High
Vertical differentiation (division of roles) High Low




Training and indoctrination Low High
Remarkable scores in bold type (see text)
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of defense, future participants will be scrutinized: screening their identity, assessing
their loyalties and technical competences (cf. Debian). So distrust is dealt with at the
gates of entry, not inside. If these measures are not enough, it is to be feared that the
level of trust as granted by design parameters will be reduced and control over
contributors tightened (more vertical centralization and vertical differentiation).
Distrust is dealt with inside, and contributes to shifting the regime towards the
mechanistic end.
5 Phase three: governance towards outside parties
A third type of OSS studies called attention to tendencies towards increasing
institutionalization. When projects grew larger and achieved more success, hackers
could no longer ignore the world outside. Firms, national and international
organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations are fascinated by OSS,
and want to jump on the bandwagon. At the same time, the institutional space as
defined at the outset of the movement, the regulated source code commons, is in
danger. The main threat is the increase of software patenting (in the US alone, about
20,000 patents are granted per year). Therefore, OSS developers are increasingly
likely to infringe upon patents held by other parties (or issuing soon). Lawsuits are
ever more likely. Ultimately, this could bring the commons to a collapse, and with
it, the foundations of the experiment of OSS as a whole.
In order to deal with these challenges and threats, projects were forced to
consciously manage their relations with parties outside of OSS. The dominant
solution is to create a legal shell around the OSS undertaking, that furthers and
protects the project’s interests. This also creates an official spokesperson for a
project. Usually, a non-profit foundation is established. Starting with Debian in
1997, accelerating from 1999 onwards, up to Linux in 2007, all major open source
projects have incorporated (cf. O’Mahony 2005). These foundations typically
handle donations, both money and hardware. Moreover, they uphold copyright
licenses (the GPL in particular), trademarks, and brand names. For the purpose,
actual code contributions may have to be formally licensed to the foundation, or
even the copyrights be handed over (cf. O’Mahony 2003). Similarly, the
foundations take care of any charges of patent infringement against their members.
Often, project and foundation have about the same membership: active community
members have the right to become members of the foundation, and as such may
elect its Board of Directors (cf. yearly elections at Debian, Apache). Project and
foundation membership may also be distinct. Take for example the Linux
Foundation: membership is reserved for external partners like firms and universities,
which have to pay a high entry fee.
Notice, that as soon as an OSS community of the democratic-organic type (cf.
Table 1) has created such a foundation as a protective shell around it, the prototype
of the ‘community managed model of governance’ has evolved, as so eloquently
described by O’Mahony in this issue. Next to pluralism, representation, decentral-
ized decision-making, and autonomous participation, the essential value of
independence is finally ensured as well.
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The further development of relations between foundations and actual projects
promises to be a fascinating area of study. As a rule, foundations are set apart from
the actual project, in order to guarantee non-interference with its proceedings.
However, due to external pressures, foundations may gradually come to dominate
the actual project. At Apache, for example, the elected Board of Directors of the
Apache Software Foundation does have a say in project work (by appointing the
Project Management Committees that oversee the modular projects; see http://
apache.org/foundation/how-it-works.html, accessed February 2007). At Gnome, to
take another example, its foundation has managed to acquire a say in planning
release dates and contents of product versions (in order to accommodate industrial
preferences) (O’Mahony 2005). These are forebodings of foundation and project
becoming ever more intertwined. If a democratic-organic regime has evolved within
communities, a sizeable transformation of structure might be the outcome. In
accordance with the ‘Iron Law of Oligarchy’ (as formulated by Michels) the regime
might well gravitate towards a less democratic and less organic form—if not de jure,
at least de facto. Ultimately, larger OSS projects are in danger of ending up being
governed like a mirror image of hierarchical firms. Democratic and organic rule (cf.
Table 1) would become a relict of the past.
6 Lessons from OSS
Towards the end, the call for papers for this roundtable about OSS governance
addressed the question: to what extent governance mechanisms for OSS may have
applications elsewhere (cf. de Laat, Introduction (...), this issue)? It would seem that
the ‘lessons’ of OSS peer production can be generalized in two ways: towards other
types of products, and towards existing institutional contexts (cf. O’Mahony, this
issue, about diffusion and adaptation of the OSS model).
6.1 Type of product
Has ‘commons-based peer production’ (Benkler) taken root elsewhere? The
institutional innovation of open source licensing (especially the GPL) has inspired
several other ‘content producers’ in the sciences, technology, and art to reveal their
creations to the general public as well. It was up to the non-profit Creative
Commons corporation (Lessig) to create a systematic licensing framework which is
now used all over the world. Their licenses have created a variety of public-domain-
like commons for intellectual resources, and actually offer more options than
defined by open source licenses in particular (cf. de Laat 2006). This is, however,
mostly a movement for open access only, not for peer production as well.
Some notable exceptions to this rule exist. For one thing, an initiative called
‘open source biology’ is being contemplated, which at the moment focuses in
particular upon virtual genetic engineering by means of software (Hessel 2006). For
another, amateur content producers have developed quite remarkable initiatives.
Next to computer users making their idle computer time available for solving radio
astronomy problems (SETI@home project), and amateur astronomers marking
Governance of open source software: state of the art 173
123
craters on Mars (NASA Clickworkers) as well as exploring outer space (as
recounted in Shah 2006b), the most prominent endeavour is the Wikipedia
community, aiming at the creation of a free on-line encyclopedia and other
reference works (Table 2). Their governance is almost an exact copy of a GPL-like
OSS community. Created entities are licensed along GPL-like terms (for text), while
internal governance, though autocratic as yet, is very organic (with training and
indoctrination still low).
However, voluntary innovation is not only to be observed for ‘informational’
products, but also for physical products. As explored by Eric von Hippel and
coworkers like Nikolaus Franke and Sonali Shah in a series of studies (Franke and
Shah 2003; von Hippel 2005), sports equipment (for windsurfing, mountain biking,
and snowboarding) is invented and tested by enthusiastic communities of sports
fanatics. These ‘lead users’ assist each other for free, and ‘freely reveal’ innovations
to one another. For this phenomenon, von Hippel coined the umbrella term ‘user
innovation’ (which is meant to cover not only physical products, but also the
informational products as discussed above) (Table 2).
What about the governance of ‘user innovation’? It will be a future challenge to
compare user networks for physical products with those for software (or
informational products in general). At first glance, the former differ from the
latter. The user-innovator sportsmen involved did not bother to patent their
innovations or impose trade secrecy, so their new designs became a public good,
unprotected from private appropriation. Moreover, as far I can judge from the
description of these networks by von Hippel et alii, no internal governance—
let alone towards outside parties—as defined above seems to develop. Such
networks for physical product innovation may be considered communities of
practice without formal governance. The causes and implications of these large
differences in governance remain to be explored. Relating back to the historical
phases of OSS governance described above, my conjecture would be that





















Software OSS Open source
companies




Reference works Wikipedia – –









Sources: de Laat (2004), von Hippel (2005)
174 P.B. de Laat
123
communities for physical product innovation, while not globally distributed but
(mostly) locally concentrated, are unlikely to evolve towards ‘maturity’ in the same
way as OSS by developing internal governance and governance towards external
parties. They are more likely to remain stuck, as it were, in phase one of
‘spontaneous’ governance.
6.2 Institutional embedding
On the other hand, the phenomenon of OSS—or, rather, user innovation networks
generally—has become a source of inspiration for established institutional actors:
how to learn from the dynamics of such ‘open innovation’, and bring its products or
its dynamics within their own sphere? Let me first discuss the case of OSS proper.
Although some university departments reportedly have adopted the OSS model for
the diffusion of their internally produced software (on GPL terms), OSS as a model
is mainly taken up by companies. As a first step, OSS as a product is being ‘free-
rided’ upon: firms tie services to the free product (like customization, consulting,
training of personnel), prepare their own hardware for it, or sell closed commercial
applications on top of it (‘open source companies’; Table 2). Notice though, that
many companies do not only take a free ride, but also voluntarily donate back
internally developed source code to the OSS project involved (cf. Henkel 2006). All
the while, communities and firms remain (largely) separate or ‘loosely coupled’.
The next step involves taking OSS seriously as a peer production process. It is an
effort to emulate work conditions as typical for OSS within the industrial context
(cf. Hertel, this issue). The main kinds of such ‘tighter coupling’ are the following
(Table 2; cf. de Laat 2004):
(1) Corporate open source networks. Software corporations decide to open up
specific technologies to hackers in general, upon OSS licensing terms, by
mounting a production platform on the Internet. Examples that come to mind
are Mozilla and Netbeans;
(2) Developer networks. Another coupling involves opening up a hard- or
software platform, whereupon outside developers are invited to write software
applications in order to enrich its value. An OSS community is created but
only for those that identify themselves as interested developers and subscribe
to licensing terms that keep the source code within the confines of the
community. Examples involve Motorola with its iDEN handsets network, and
Nokia with its Open Standards Terminal software platform;
(3) Enterprise networks. As a final possibility, open source networks for software
development may be installed inside corporations, behind the corporate
firewall, connecting the firm’s globally distributed subsidiaries. Companies
like HP and SUN employ such practices.
Along these forms of tighter embeddedness, the main parameter that changes is
access: smaller circles of admitted members are delineated. Associated with this,
licensing becomes more restrictive, sharing being permitted only among insiders.
Communities effectively become ‘gated’.
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How are gated communities being governed? Which mechanisms of proper OSS
governance are copied, if any? As for ‘corporate open source networks’, relations
with the founder firm are an important variable. If, in due time, the network is spun
off as an independent venture (this happened to Mozilla and Eclipse), it will evolve
as a ‘proper’ OSS community (cf. the discussion in O’Mahony, this issue, about
sponsor founded versus community founded projects). However, the founder firm
may prefer to retain influence. Concerning these production platforms, still under
sponsor control, and the very similar ‘developer networks’, empirical data about
governance are lacking as yet. I would argue, though, that a whole array of internal
governance tools is likely to be employed just as for OSS proper (cf. phase two
above). In particular, if a company controls incorporation of source code and
formally owns the code tree (cf. the ‘gated source’ community analyzed in Shah
2006a), an autocratic-mechanistic structure is to be expected. In ‘enterprise
networks’, ultimately, governance is determined by company rules. Licensing
proceeds along the closed code model, and volunteers ultimately have to obey the
company hierarchy. The only thing remaining from OSS governance might be the
formidable collection of software development tools for virtual collaboration.
What about user innovation in physical products as a source of inspiration for
established companies? Coupling mechanisms, as described by von Hippel (2005),
are quite similar to those just described for OSS. Firms do occasionally incorporate
innovative designs from lead users and proceed to mass manufacture them (‘free-
riding’); or the lead users involved themselves establish a company precisely for the
purpose (‘lifestyle firms’). Notice that this is the only way in which these innovative
designs can be mass produced and distributed. The investments involved are simply
too high for user innovators on their own (as opposed to the case of informational
products, the Internet allowing instant distribution at no cost).
As a final step, producers of physical products may try, just like producers of
software, to introduce peer production within the company (tight coupling).
Experiments as mentioned by von Hippel (2005, ch. 9) include the provision of
platform products and toolkits for design. Hopefully, these will help users start
innovating. Recently, the LEGO Group has even provided software design tools for
its young clientele. Notice that these initiatives are quite analogous to the corporate
open source networks and developer networks for OSS previously described
(Table 2). As for the study of governance mechanisms that apply to embedded
networks for physical products, it is quite virgin territory—research data are
lacking. Sporadic evidence suggests, that such networks are not interconnected, but
consist of empowered individuals tied together by a focal point (hub-and-spoke
structure). Remarkably, ‘enterprise networks’ for physical products, although
conceivable, are mentioned nowhere.
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